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ABSTRACT 
In 1971, Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
(ANCSA) in order to settle land disputes between Alaska Natives and the 
federal government. ANCSA established Alaska Native Corporations 
(ANCs), which were tasked with managing settlement funds to provide for 
the health, education, and economic welfare of Alaska Natives. To enable the 
ANCs to promote the interests of their shareholders, Congress exempted 
ANCs from certain employment restrictions contained in Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act, but did not exempt ANCs from other worker-protective 
legislation. In subsequent decades, courts reviewing the preferential practices 
of ANCs have often construed these statutory exemptions narrowly, thus 
exposing ANCs to liability under various anti-discrimination statutes. This 
Article argues that Congress never intended to subject ANCs to these pieces 
of worker-protective legislation, despite court holdings to the contrary. The 
Article proposes two possible solutions to this discrepancy: (1) congressional 
amendment of ANCSA to clarify and further limit the extent of ANC 
liability; and (2) judicial adoption of a two-part test which would consider 
employment policies giving preference to Alaska Native shareholders in light 
of Congress’s intent to protect such preferences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Forty-five years after President Richard Nixon signed the Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA)1 into law, Alaska Native 
Corporations (ANCs) dominate the state economy2 and are an economic 
force both nationally and globally.3 According to Alaska Business 
Monthly, ANCs made up eight of the top ten Alaskan-owned and 
operated companies in the state, based on 2012 gross revenues.4 Arctic 
Slope Regional Corporation has topped the chart for approximately 
twenty years, with gross revenues of more than $2.62 billion in 2012.5 
Bristol Bay Native Corporation was second with gross revenues of $1.96 
billion, NANA Regional Corporation was third with gross revenues of 
$1.8 billion, and Chenega Corporation was fourth with gross revenues of 
$1.1 billion.6 ANCs represented around forty-five percent of all Alaskan-
owned and operated entities included in Alaska Business Monthly, and 
they collectively reported $11.8 billion in 2012 gross revenues—around 
seventy-four percent of all gross revenues reported.7 In 2012, ANCs 
provided more than 59,546 jobs globally—more than 17,105 in Alaska—
comprising eighty-four percent of total jobs reported by the top forty-
nine Alaskan-owned businesses.8 The jobs provided by ANCs 
represented sixty-six percent of those employed in Alaska in the private 
sector.9 
Despite such overwhelming success, the ANCs also face a difficult 
challenge: sustaining jobs and economic development for the next 
generation of Native shareholders in a post-downturn economy while 
confronting a political environment as harsh as the Arctic. Congress 
intended that ANCs be afforded latitude and flexibility in their hiring- 
and employment-related decisions, allowing them to develop policies 
that promote the economic development and welfare of their 
shareholders. In the intervening decades, however, the law developed in 
unexpected ways and its application has sometimes caused unintended 
consequences. This Article explores the history and future of 
employment preferences and statutory exemptions for ANCs. We argue 
 
 1.  Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 1601–29h (2012)). 
 2.  Tasha Anderson, Alaska Business Monthly’s 2013 Top 49ers: Blockbusters of 
Business, ALASKA BUS. MONTHLY, Oct. 2013, at 92, 94. 
 3.  Id. at 92. 
 4.  Id. at 96–106. 
 5.  Id. at 96. 
 6.  Id. at 98–100. 
 7.  Id. at 122–23. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
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that Congress and the courts should protect and extend the ability of 
ANCs to adopt employment preferences that are consistent with, and 
advance, Congressional goals of promoting Alaska Native economic 
growth and stability. 
I.  BACKGROUND: HOW ANCS ARE SIMILAR TO, YET 
DIFFERENT FROM, INDIAN TRIBES 
Congress’s creation of ANCs represented a radical departure from 
the historic way in which the federal government had dealt with the 
indigenous peoples inhabiting what became the United States. At the 
inception of this nation, the U.S. Constitution granted power to 
Congress to regulate commerce with the Indian Tribes.10 Two-hundred 
years later, Indian Tribes are now viewed legally as “domestic 
dependent nations,” a label reflecting the troubled history of 
misinterpreted treaties,11 land disputes,12 and cultural conflict13 that 
culminated in the Indian reservation system. The reservation system 
dominates national Indian policy in the forty-eight contiguous states.14 
 
 10.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[The Congress shall have power] [t]o 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes . . . .”). 
 11.  See U.S. INDIAN CLAIMS COMM’N, FINAL REPORT 7 (1978) (“The 
Commission Act allowed any identifiable group of Indian claimants . . . to sue 
the Government for . . . claims which would result if the treaties, contracts, and 
agreements between the claimant and the United States were revised on the 
ground of . . . mutual or unilateral mistake, whether of law or fact . . . .”). 
 12.  See, e.g., Indian Appropriations Act of 1989, ch. 412, §§ 12–15, 25 Stat. 
980, 1004–06 (requiring that land taken from the Seminole Indians be disposed to 
settlers under the homestead laws). 
 13.  See DAVID E. STANNARD, AMERICAN HOLOCAUST: COLUMBUS AND THE 
CONQUEST OF THE NEW WORLD, ix–xv (1992) (discussing the four-hundred year 
history of European conquest of North and South America; documenting the 
massacre of Indian peoples and the decimation of Indian populations through 
war, disease, and poverty; and characterizing that massacre as the most massive 
act of genocide in the history of the world). 
 14.  There are currently about 326 Indian Reservations in the United States 
with a collective geographical area of 56.2 million acres, or about 2.3% of the 
area of the United States. Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEPARTMENT INTERIOR: 
INDIAN AFFAIRS, http://www.bia.gov/FAQs/index.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 
2014). There are more than 550 Indian Tribes recognized by the federal 
government, including those in Alaska and Hawaii. Id. Some tribes have no 
reservation. Alaska has a land mass of 586,412 square miles but contains only 
one reservation—the Metlakatla Indian Community in Southeast Alaska, id., 
created by Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 15, 26 Stat. 1095, 1101 (codified at 25 
U.S.C. § 495 (2012)). 
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A.  The Tribal Reservation System in the Lower Forty-Eight States 
Indian reservations are the result of early peace treaties in which 
Indian Tribes surrendered large portions of their land to the U.S. 
government in return for guarantees that other parcels of land would be 
“reserved” for the exclusive use of the Tribe as a sovereign nation.15 
Eventually, the U.S. government began to forcibly relocate Tribes to 
parcels of land to which they had no historical connection.16 Forced 
relocation led to tragedies such as the Trail of Tears, in which five 
nations—the Cherokee, Muscogee (Creek), Seminole, Chickasaw and 
Choctaw—were marched from various parts of the southeastern United 
States to “Indian Territory.”17 An estimated four thousand of the 
seventeen thousand Cherokee on the march died from exposure, 
disease, and starvation en route.18 In 1851, Congress authorized the 
creation of Indian reservations in what was to become modern 
Oklahoma.19 Later reservations were established by executive order, and 
eventually came to be regulated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).20 
During the period from the mid-1850s through the end of World 
War II, Congressional efforts to regulate the nation’s relationship with 
Indian Tribes flip-flopped between the polar-opposite goals of 
assimilation and autonomy. Indian assimilation laws mandated 
absorbing Indian Tribes into the great “melting pot” of America’s 
ethnically diverse population, so that Native Americans would cease to 
exist as separately identifiable peoples.21 Indian autonomy laws, on the 
 
 15.  See, e.g., Francis v. Francis, 203 U.S. 233, 237 (1906) (describing how the 
Chippewa Nation of Indians ceded certain lands to the United States, within 
which tracts were reserved for the exclusive use of the Chippewa and their 
descendants). 
 16.  See, e.g., Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830) (authorizing the 
removal of Indian Tribes from the United States to west of the Mississippi). 
 17.  Russell Thornton, Cherokee Population Losses During the Trail of Tears: A 
New Perspective and a New Estimate, 31 ETHNOHISTORY 289, 289 (1984). 
 18.  A Brief History of the Trail of Tears, CHEROKEE NATION, 
http://www.cherokee.org/AboutTheNation/History/TrailofTears/ABriefHist
oryoftheTrailofTears.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). See also Thornton, supra 
note 17, at 292–94 (estimating eight thousand Cherokee died en route). 
 19.  Indian Appropriations Act of 1851, ch. 14, 9 Stat. 574. 
 20.  The Office of Indian Affairs was established on March 11, 1824 as an 
office of the U.S. Department of War. BIA: History of BIA, US DEPARTMENT 
INTERIOR: INDIAN AFFAIRS, http://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/BIA/ (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2014). In 1849, it was transferred to the Department of the Interior. Id. In 
1947, it was renamed the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Id. 
 21.  See, e.g., General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch.119, 24 Stat. 388 
(repealed 2000) (breaking up the land holdings of most Tribes and authorizing 
the distribution of land to individual Indian families in modest parcels, with the 
remainder being sold off to white settlers, and extended citizenship to those 
Indians who accepted farm land and became “civilized”). See also DEP’T OF THE 
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other hand, acknowledged cultural differences and granted quasi-
sovereign powers to the Indian Tribes, including the rights to form tribal 
governments and tribal courts, to self-govern tribal members, and to 
collectively control the disposition of tribal lands. These laws also 
granted the power to form Tribal corporations, when approved by the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, and to engage in commercial enterprises on the 
open market.22 But despite Congressional efforts, by the late 1950s the 
reservation system was acknowledged as a failure.23 The system had 
succeeded only in creating an endless cycle of Indian poverty and 
economic dependence on the federal government.24 
B.  Alaska Natives: A Different History 
Unlike the Tribes of the lower forty-eight states, most Alaska 
Natives were not conquered by the United States in war, nor were they 
forced onto federal reservations. Alaska was purchased from Russia by 
the federal government in 1867 through a Treaty of Cession ratified by 
the Senate.25 The federal government had no formal treaty relationship 
with the indigenous people of Alaska, however, and gained from Russia 
only the rights of conquest that Russia had obtained during its own 
dominion over the Alaska Territory—which, significantly, did not 
include the conquest of the “Uncivilized Tribes.”26 Therefore, these 
Tribes did not automatically become citizens of the United States upon 
ratification of the treaty but were, instead, subject to future laws the 
 
INTERIOR, OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, RULES GOVERNING THE COURT OF INDIAN 
AFFAIRS (1883) (making it unlawful for Indians to engage in traditional dances, 
feasts, polygamy, funeral practices, to become intoxicated, or to practice 
“heathenish rites and customs” such as “medicine men” or other Indian 
religious practices). 
 22.  See, e.g., The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, §§ 16–17, 48 Stat. 
984, 987–88 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 476 (2012)) (granting these rights 
and powers). 
 23.  See H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 67 Stat. 132 (Supp. B 1953) (beginning 
the termination policy of the United States by removing the special legal status 
of some Native Americans). 
 24.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Selected Characteristics of People at Specified Levels of 
Poverty in the Past 12 Months: 2012 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, 
factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=
ACS_12_1YR_S1703&prodType=table (last visited Mar. 3, 2014) (showing a 
poverty rate of 29.1% for Native Americans and Alaska Natives, compared with 
a poverty rate of 15.9% for the general population). 
 25.  The U.S. Treasury paid $7.2 million for the Alaska Territory, about two 
cents per acre. Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in 
North America, U.S.-Russ., art. VI, June 20, 1867, 15 Stat. 539. 
 26.  Id. at art. III. 
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United States would adopt.27 Aboriginal land titles were not an 
important issue for the United States for nearly one hundred years. Even 
when Alaska was admitted as the forty-ninth state on January 3, 1959,28 
the status of aboriginal land title was left unaddressed.29 
C.  Impact of Statehood & the Discovery of Oil at Prudhoe Bay 
In 1968, when the Atlantic-Richfield Company discovered oil at 
Prudhoe Bay on the Arctic coast of Alaska, the issue of Alaska Native 
land entitlements caught fire and grew into a political conflict that 
threatened to engulf the new state.30 With a national energy crisis 
looming, car owners would soon be lined up at the pump, waiting to 
buy the seemingly dwindling national supply of gasoline.31 Soaring 
international oil prices sparked new interest in domestic oil and gas 
exploration.32 In a single day, the newly formed State of Alaska sold 
nearly $1 billion in oil leases.33 The federal government was actively 
issuing valuable oil and mineral exploration permits in the Arctic to 
other private corporations—despite protests by Alaska Natives.34 
Alaska Natives saw their hunting and fishing lands, essential to 
sustain their traditional subsistence way of life,35 snatched up by 
 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958). 
 29.  For an excellent summary of the status of aboriginal title and the history 
of Alaska Native land claims before and after statehood, see James D. Linxwiler, 
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: The First Twenty Years, 38 ROCKY MTN. 
MIN. L. INST. 2-1 (1992). 
 30.  Compare United States v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 F. Supp. 1009, 1031 (D. 
Alaska 1977), aff’d, 612 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that ANCSA 
extinguished all claims of Alaska Native entitlement to damages for use of land 
prior to ANCSA), with Edwardsen v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359, 1367–79 (D.D.C. 
1973) (refusing to hold that ANCSA wiped out claims for prior injuries). 
 31.  Greg Myre, Gas Lines Evoke Memories of Oil Crises in the 1970s, NPR: THE 
PICTURE SHOW (Nov. 10, 2012), www.npr.org/blogs/pictureshow/2012/11/ 
10/164792293/gas-lines-evoke-memories-oil-crises-in-the-1970s. 
 32.  See Wendy Koch, U.S. Oil Supply Looks Vulnerable Forty Years After 
Embargo, U.S.A. TODAY (Oct. 19, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
news/nation/2013/10/19/us-oil-imports-opec-embargo/2997499/ (noting qua-
drupled energy prices as a result of a foreign oil embargo and the subsequent 
energy independence movement). 
 33.  Atl. Richfield Co., 435 F. Supp. at 1017. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  The term “subsistence way of life” refers to a culture based partly in 
hunting and gathering across the annual cycle of the seasons. Many villages are 
not located on any road system, making subsistence harvesting necessary to 
prevent a low standard of living. Shauna Woods, Note, The “Middle Place”: The 
NPR-A Impact Mitigation Program and Alaska’s North Slope, 30 ALASKA L. REV. 263, 
268 (2013). 
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outsiders. Fear and outrage motivated Alaska Natives to swiftly 
organize themselves into groups and associations to fight the taking, 
selling and leasing of their lands by the state and federal governments.36 
Alaska Native protests quickly grew so fierce that by early 1969, the 
Secretary of the Interior instituted a “land freeze” where the federal 
process of approving state land selections and all other applications for 
public lands in Alaska was uniformly suspended, allowing time for a 
legislative settlement of the Native land rights controversy.37 
D.  A Legislative Solution: The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
The Alaska Native community, the oil industry, and the State of 
Alaska lobbied Congress heavily for three years, until a legislative 
settlement was reached and passed into law as the ANCSA.38 ANCSA 
purportedly would extinguish all aboriginal title land claims in the State 
of Alaska,39 once and for all, by granting Alaska Natives title to nearly 
forty-million acres of land40 and a payment of $962.5 million as a cash 
settlement.41 The mechanism for effecting the settlement established an 
entirely new way of managing federal Indian policy for Alaska Natives: 
one free from the paternalistic oversight that marked the government’s 
relationship with Tribes and reservations in the lower forty-eight 
 
 36.  The Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN) was formed in 1966. Atl. 
Richfield Co., 435 F. Supp. at 1017. By 1968, AFN and other Alaska Native groups 
filed forty claims covering 296,000,000 acres (approximately eighty percent of 
Alaska). Id. 
 37.  Public Land Order 4582, issued January 17, 1969, states, in part: 
Subject to valid existing rights, and subject to the conditions hereinafter 
set forth, all public lands in Alaska which are unreserved or which 
would otherwise become unreserved prior to the expiration of this 
order, are hereby withdrawn from all forms of appropriation and 
disposition under the public land laws (except locations for 
metalliferous minerals), including selection by the State of Alaska 
pursuant to the Alaska Statehood Act (72 Stat. 339), and from leasing 
under the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920 (41 Stat. 437; 30 
U.S.C. 181 et seq.), as amended, and reserved under the jurisdiction of 
the Secretary of the Interior for the determination and protection of the 
rights of the Native Aleuts, Eskimos and Indians of Alaska. 
Withdrawal of Unreserved Lands, 34 Fed. Reg. 1025 (Jan. 17, 1969). 
 38.  Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 
1601—29h (2012)). 
 39.  Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANSCA), Pub. L. No. 92-203, § 4, 
85 Stat. 688, 689–90 (1971) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1603 (2012)). 
 40.  See ANCSA, §§ 11–16, 85 Stat. at 696–706 (codified as amended at 43 
U.S.C. §§ 1610–15 (2012)) (describing the process by which specific tribes may 
take title). 
 41.  ANCSA, § 6, 85 Stat. at 690–91 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1605 
(2012)). 
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states.42 
E.  The Formation of ANCs and Enrollment of Shareholders 
In ANCSA, Congress divided the State of Alaska into twelve 
regions (the “Regions”) based on common language and customs, and 
mandated that each Region form one Regional Corporation, and a 
number of Village Corporations, that would receive title to the land and 
a portion of the cash settlement.43 The Alaska Natives in each Region 
were enrolled as common shareholders of their Regional Corporation 
and local shareholders of their respective Village Corporations.44 The 
goal of those corporations, the ANCs, was to become economic engines 
for the Regions and Villages—developing lands, investing in business 
opportunities, and providing shareholders with jobs, dividends, and 
cultural assistance in order to preserve the Alaska Native way of life for 
future generations. Stock in the ANCs was restricted so that it could 
only be issued to Alaska Natives and could not be sold or easily 
alienated for the first twenty years after the effective date of ANCSA.45 
These restraints on alienation protected the land-base and governance of 
the ANCs from passing out of Alaska Native control by preventing 
 
 42.  ANCSA states, in part: 
[T]he settlement shall be accomplished rapidly, with certainty, in 
conformity with the real economic and social needs of Natives, without 
litigation, with maximum participation by Natives in decisions 
affecting their rights and property, without establishing any permanent 
racially defined institutions, rights, privileges, or obligations, without 
creating a reservation system or lengthy wardship or trusteeship, and 
without adding to the categories of property and institutions enjoying 
special tax privileges or to the legislation establishing special 
relationships between the United States Government and the State of 
Alaska. 
ANCSA, § 2(b), 85 Stat. at 688 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (2012)). 
 43.  ANCSA, §§ 7–8, 85 Stat. at 691–94 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 
1606–07 (2012)). 
 44.  ANCSA, § 5, 85 Stat. at 690 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1604 
(2012)). ANCSA also provided that Alaska Natives living outside the State of 
Alaska could share in the settlement by forming a thirteenth Regional 
Corporation. ANCSA, § 7, 85 Stat. at 692 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 
1606 (2012)). The thirteenth Region was formed December 31, 1975 and allocated 
$52 million in settlement funds, but no land. Jill Burke, The 13th Regional, Alaska’s 
‘Ghost Corporation,’ ALASKA DISPATCH (Jan. 18, 2011), 
www.alaskadispatch.com/article/13th-regional-alaskas-ghost-corporation. It 
was active for a number of years, but after a series of bad business transactions, 
it ceased functioning as a viable corporation in 2008 and has ceased filing annual 
reports with the State of Alaska. Id. 
 45.  ANCSA, § 7(g)–(h), 85 Stat. at 692–93 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 1606(g)–(h) (2012)). 
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individual shareholders from selling or pledging their stock to non-
Natives. 
1. ANC Shareholder Criteria and Enrollment by BIA 
 
As originally envisioned by Congress, only Alaska Natives, defined 
as those U.S. citizens of at least twenty-five percent Alaska Native blood 
quantum,46 alive on December 18, 1971—the date ANCSA was signed 
into law—were eligible to be enrolled by BIA as shareholders in their 
respective Regional and Village Corporations.47 Only enrolled 
shareholders were issued stock in the ANCs.48 Shareholders did not 
have to pay any money for their shares, as the extinguishment of their 
aboriginal land claims constituted consideration in exchange for stock 
ownership.49 Each shareholder was issued one hundred shares of 
Settlement Common Stock that carried with it voting rights and the right 
to receive dividends from the corporation, should it prove profitable.50 
2. Intent for Future Alaska Natives to Share in the Settlement 
 
While Congress did not initially intend for future generations of 
Alaska Natives born after the effective date of ANCSA to share in the 
 
 46.  ANCSA, § 3(b), 85 Stat. at 689 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 
1602(b) (2012)). 
 47.  ANCSA, § 5, 85 Stat. at 690 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1604 
(2012)). BIA mandated that families were to be kept together and enrolled in the 
same Region and Village as much as possible. ANCSA, § 5(b), 85 Stat. at 690 
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1604(b) (2012)). Those Alaska Natives living 
within one of the twelve designated Regions, but not associated with any local 
Village, were still allowed to enroll in their Regional Corporations. See ANCSA, 
§ 7(j), 85 Stat. at 693 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1606(j) (2012)) (referring 
to “the class of stockholders who are not residents of those villages”). 
 48.  ANCSA, § 7(g), 85 Stat. at 692 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 
1606(g) (2012)). 
 49.  ANCSA, § 4, 85 Stat. at 689–90 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1603 
(2012)). 
 50.  ANCSA, § 7(g)–(h)(1), 85 Stat. at 692 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 1606(g)–(h)(1) (2012)). But profitability was never guaranteed—many of the 
ANCs struggled to become profitable and issue dividends in their early years. 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: Alaska Native Regional Corporations, CIRI, 
www.ciri.com/content/history/regional.aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
Recently, however, ANCs have been performing more successfully. For 
example, Doyon recently celebrated its twenty-seventh consecutive year of 
profitability, and has issued a dividend to its shareholders every year since 1987. 
Dividends and Distributions, DOYON, LTD., www.doyon.com/shareholders/ 
distributions.aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). All twelve Regional Corporations 
made the Alaska Business Monthly’s list of Top 49ers. ALASKA BUS. MONTHLY, 
supra note 2, at 96–116. The troubles faced by the thirteenth Regional 
Corporation are detailed supra note 44. 
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land settlement by receiving stock through gifts, that policy has since 
changed.51 But, to keep voting power in Alaska Native hands, Congress 
did provide that if ANC stock passed to a person with less than twenty-
five percent Alaska Native blood quantum through inheritance in the 
initial twenty-year period, voting rights would automatically be 
removed.52 However, this scheme proved cumbersome53 and 
unsustainable; the ultimate effect was that ANC stock did not transfer 
evenly to successive generations of Alaska Natives, leaving the majority 
of Alaska Natives born after 1971 with no direct shareholder 
participation in the ANCs or the land settlement.54 
3. 1988 ANCSA Amendments: Options to Remove Stock Restrictions 
 
In 1988, Congress tried to solve many of the problems that had 
developed during the first two decades by passing technical 
amendments authorizing ANC shareholders to vote on whether their 
corporations would continue the original alienation restrictions or 
remove the restrictions and offer ANC stock for public sale.55 However, 
protecting Native ownership of the land is such a strong cultural 
imperative, that to date, none of the ANCs has ever elected to remove 
ANC stock alienability restrictions.56 Shareholders of stock can now 
 
 51.  Compare ANCSA, § 7(h), 85 Stat. at 692–93 (failing to provide a gift 
clause), with 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h) (2012) (containing a gift clause after subsequent 
amendments). 
 52. ANCSA, § 7(h)(2), 85 Stat. at 693 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 
1606(h)(2) (2012)). However, if shares of Settlement Common Stock with voting 
rights removed are ever lawfully transferred back to a person with at least 
twenty-five percent Alaska Native blood quantum, or the descendant of such a 
person, voting rights will automatically be restored. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h)(2)(c)(ii) 
(2012). 
 53.  See ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.705(b) (2013) (providing for owners to pass 
stock to the next generation through forms printed on the individual stock 
certificates); § 13.16.705(a) (requiring ANCs to determine the heirs of their own 
shareholders who died intestate). 
 54.  Natalie Landreth & Moira Smith, Voting Rights in Alaska: 1982–2006, 17 
S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 79, 84 & n.18 (2007). 
 55.  Act of Feb. 3, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-241, 101 Stat. 1788 (codified at 43 
U.S.C. § 1606(g) (2012)). The Congressional scheme for removing restraints on 
alienation was complex and granted ANC shareholders many options and great 
flexibility on how to restructure their corporations. They could, for example, 
remove alienability restrictions on all Settlement Common Stock, or create a 
separate class of non-voting stock that could be freely alienated, while retaining 
alienability restrictions on Settlement Common Stock. Id. They could create new 
classes of stock for Alaska Natives born after 1971 or their descendants with an 
Alaska Native blood quantum of less than twenty-five percent, and issue 
additional classes of voting or non-voting stock to elders, among other things. Id. 
 56.  See E. Budd Simpson, Doing Business with Alaska Native Corporations: A 
New Model for Native American Business Entities, BUS. LAW TODAY, July/August 
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devise to non-Alaska Natives by passing the stock to a non-Alaska 
Native surviving spouse of a shareholder, under the Alaska laws of 
intestate succession, allowing for more diversity in the shareholder 
base.57 
As part of the 1988 technical amendments, Congress also granted 
ANCs the right to open enrollment to descendants of shareholders born 
after 1971.58 ANCs were given the option to issue these new 
shareholders “life estate stock” that would, upon the shareholder’s 
death, be canceled and revert back to the ANC—thus simplifying the 
inheritance problems associated with original Settlement Common 
Stock.59 A super-majority of sixty-six percent of the issued and 
outstanding voting shares is required to approve enrollment of new 
shareholders.60 To date, only a small number of the Regional 
Corporations, including Arctic Slope Regional Corporation, Doyon, 
Limited, and Sea-Alaska Corporation, among others, have voted to 
enroll Alaska Natives born after 1971 as shareholders.61 
4. ANCs’ Purpose Expanded to Include Social & Cultural Support 
 
A subsequent ANCSA amendment enacted in 1998 clarified 
Congressional intent by authorizing ANCs to provide “health, 
 
2007, at 38 (explaining that all ANCSA corporations remain in Alaska Native 
ownership as no corporation has lifted transfer restrictions). 
 57.  ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.102(b) (2013) (intestate share of ANC Settlement 
Common Stock passes one-hundred percent to surviving spouse if there is no 
surviving issue and fifty percent to surviving spouse and fifty percent to 
surviving issue if one exists). 
 58.  43 U.S.C. § 1606(g)(1)(B)(i)(I) (2012). 
 59.  See § 1606(g)(1)(B)(iii)(II)(aa) (ANC stock deemed canceled on the death 
of the Alaska Native shareholder to whom stock was issued with no 
compensation for the cancellation paid to the estate of the deceased Alaska 
Native or any person holding the stock). 
 60.  See ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.504(d) (stating that an affirmative vote of at 
least two-thirds of all issued and outstanding shares is required to approve an 
amendment to the articles of incorporation for corporations existing before July 
1, 1989). As ANCs were formed prior to 1989, they are governed by Alaska’s 
former corporations code. See § 10.05 (repealed 1989). When Alaska adopted its 
new corporations code, it lowered the voting standard for approval of an 
amendment to the articles of incorporation from a supermajority to a simple 
majority of the issued and outstanding shares. See § 10.06.504(a) (laying out the 
process for a corporation to amend its articles of incorporation). Corporations 
formed under section 10.05 of the Alaska Statutes could vote to amend its 
articles to lower the percentage to a simple majority; however, this vote would 
require a supermajority. See §§ 10.06.504(d)–(e) (explaining that a change in 
voting provisions would require the same voting standard as an amendment to 
the articles of incorporation). 
 61.  ALASKA NATIVE CULTURES AND ISSUES: RESPONSES TO FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS 23 (Libby Roderick ed., 2d ed. 2010). 
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education, or welfare” benefits to their shareholders.62 This mandate 
extends the ANC mission beyond that of other Alaska for-profit 
corporations, even allowing ANCs to give preferential treatment to 
some classes of shareholders over others, as long as the purpose will 
fulfill the mission of providing health, education or welfare benefits to 
the preferred group of shareholders.63 For example, financial support 
could be given for cultural activities not available to all shareholders 
equally, or additional dividends could be given to elders.64 
F.  Small Business Administration Program 
Additionally, Congress granted ANCs advantages in federal 
programs designed to foster minority participation in government 
contracting, such as the Small Business Administration (SBA) 8(a) 
Business Development Program.65 Many ANCs have utilize 
government-contracting as a means of providing shareholder jobs and 
increasing annual revenues (and thus shareholder dividends) to offset 
the difficulty of creating economic growth in remote areas of rural 
Alaska.66 Unfortunately, because often so little is known about ANCs 
 
 62.  Act of Oct. 31, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-333, 112 Stat. 3129 (codified at 43 
U.S.C. § 1606(r) (2012)) (“The authority of a Native Corporation to provide 
benefits to its shareholders who are Natives or descendants of Natives or to its 
shareholders’ immediate family members who are Natives or descendants of 
Natives to promote the health, education, or welfare of such shareholders or 
family members is expressly authorized and confirmed.”). This ANCSA 
amendment was prompted by the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in Hanson v. 
Kake Tribal Corporation, 939 P.2d 1320 (Alaska 1997), in which the court affirmed 
a lower court ruling that ANCs could not, consistent with state law, grant 
preferential distributions to one group of shareholders over another. Id. at 1324. 
 63.  43 U.S.C. § 1606(r) (2012). 
 64.  See id. (“Eligibility for such benefits need not be based on share 
ownership in the Native Corporation and such benefits may be provided on a 
basis other than pro rata based on share ownership.”). 
 65.  See 13 C.F.R. § 124.109 (2012) (describing special rules for Alaska Native 
Corporations under the SBA 8(a) Business Development Program). ANCs and 
Indian Tribes can own more than one SBA 8(a) certified Small Disadvantaged 
Business Entity, where most Americans can only own one. § 124.109(b)(5). This 
is viewed by some as an unfair advantage, but the regulation makes sense in 
light of the historically economically and socially disadvantaged Alaska Native 
shareholders for whom they are congressionally mandated to provide economic, 
health, and welfare benefits. ANCs also were granted an exemption from the 
limits on the size of sole source contracts (i.e. contracts awarded without 
competition). These could be awarded because ANCs generally have stronger 
resources to handle larger contracts than individually owned 8(a) firms. § 
124.506(b). 
 66. Contracting Preferences for Alaska Native Corporations: Hearing Before the Ad 
Hoc Subcomm. on Contracting Oversight of the Comm. on Homeland Sec. & 
Governmental Affairs. 111th Cong. 5–6 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 Hearings] 
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outside of Alaska, congressional motivation to assist them is often 
lacking or misdirected.67 
This can be seen in the growing political pressure in certain 
segments of Congress to limit or restrict employment or contracting 
preferences granted to ANCSA corporations, or to change the nature of 
those preferences.68 In recent years, hostility towards employment or 
contracting preferences for ANCs has spread.69 Sole source contracts 
awarded to ANCSA corporations or their joint ventures under Section 
8(a) of the Small Business Act have generated much concern. Led by 
Senators Claire McCaskill (D-Mo.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.),70 critics 
have voiced objections that sole source contracts are inefficient, drive up 
costs by eliminating competition, and create a corrupting environment 
in which bribes and kickbacks thrive.71 
While some of this criticism may be well-taken, after extensive 
review by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) and the SBA Office 
of the Inspector General (OIG), only a small proportion of abuses 
involving ANCs were uncovered in the SBA’s 8(a) program.72 When 
viewed in light of the small ANC share of the total sole source 
government contracts awarded each year, one may infer that allegations 
 
(statement of Sen. Begich). 
 67.  See, e.g., id. at 1–2 (statement of Sen. McCaskill) (noting the need to 
reduce wasteful government spending and calling for a closer look at 
contracting loopholes for ANCs). The hearing was called, in part, on the 
dramatic growth in ANC contracting, which increased by $4.7 billion between 
2000 and 2008 at a rate nearly six times faster than overall federal contract 
spending. See id. at 139–40. 
 68.  See KATE M. MANUEL, ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40855, 
CONTRACTING PROGRAMS FOR ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS: HISTORICAL 
DEVELOPMENT & LEGAL AUTHORITIES 21 (2012) (summarizing bills introduced in 
the 112th Congress to limit ANC contracting, including, among others, H.R. 598 
and S. 236 that would remove all “special rules” for contracting with ANC-
owned 8(a) firms and preclude them from receiving sole source awards in excess 
of limits imposed on individually owned 8(a) firms). 
 69.  See 2009 Hearings, supra note 66, at 139 (noting concerns that critics have 
had for ANC contracting preferences). See also Letter from Senators McCaskill 
and McCain to Acting Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & 
Logistics (Oct. 12, 2011) [hereinafter McCaskill and McCain Letter] (expressing 
concern for special rules that apply to ANCs in defense contracting, including 
sole source contract awards by the Department of Defense to ANCs). 
 70.  See McCaskill and McCain Letter, supra note 69 (explaining the ease of 
ANCs using a sole source contract to enter a “pass-through arrangement” as 
part of a fraud scheme). 
 71.  E.g., Catherine Lynn Allison, Note, Alaska Native Corporations: Reclaiming 
the Namesake; Effectuating the Purpose, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 869, 870, 878, 880 (2013). 
 72.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-399, CONTRACT 
MANAGEMENT: INCREASED USE OF ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS’ SPECIAL 8(A) 
PROVISIONS CALLS FOR TAILORED OVERSIGHT 53 (2006). 
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of ANCs abuses have been overblown.73 Much of the criticism seems 
driven by competitors in the contracting field with their own agendas to 
advance.74 The end result is a climate suspicious of programs designed 
to advance the economic well-being of ANC shareholders. 
G.  Differences Between ANCs and Tribes or Tribal Corporations 
In some ways the difference between ANCs and Tribes or Tribal 
Corporations is slight: both offer the means for Native Americans to 
work together with the federal government to preserve and protect 
Native land and cultural identity, elect their own Native leaders, form 
subsidiary entities to engage in commercial enterprises, and provide 
certain benefits to their own members or shareholders. 
In other ways, the differences between Tribes and ANCs are more 
pronounced. ANC lands have few of the binding legal restrictions that 
encumber Tribes and reservation lands. ANCs are not “tribal entities” 
and do not exercise quasi-governmental functions or powers over Tribal 
members.75 The land ANCs received under ANCSA is not “Indian 
Country” for most purposes,76 so ANCs have no “Tribal Police,” and 
have little to do with Indian Gaming or other reservation economic 
development schemes that apply to Tribes in the lower forty-eight states 
who hold land as part of a federal reserve. Instead, ANCs are “for-
profit” corporations, modeled after, and subject to, most of the same 
rights, limitations and economic risks as other privately-held Alaska 
corporations.77 
ANCSA envisioned a future where Alaska Natives were free from 
the cycle of social and economic dependency on the federal government 
 
 73.  Native 8(a) Briefing, NATIVE AM. CONTRACTORS ASS’N 1, 8 (Aug. 2010), 
http://www.nativecontractors.org/media/pdf/Native%208_a_%20Briefing%20
Paper%20with%20Images.pdf (noting that, in 2007, while thirty-two percent of 
all federal contracts awarded were sole sourced, ANCs 8(a) sole source awards 
represented less than 0.08 percent of all contracts issued). 
 74.  Daniel K. Oakes, Note, Inching Toward Balance: Reaching Proper Reform of 
the Alaska Native Corporations’ 8(a) Contracting Preferences, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 777, 
786–87 (2011). 
 75.  See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services From the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,868 (August 10, 2012) (listing the 
Native Entities within Alaska eligible to receive BIA services). 
 76.  See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 526–27, 
532 (1998) (holding lands received under ANCSA are not “Indian Country” as 
ANC shareholders are not dependent Indian communities in the same way as 
Indian Reservations in the lower forty-eight states, and therefore cannot exercise 
quasi-sovereign powers such as taxation on ANCSA land). 
 77.  43 U.S.C. § 1606(d) (2012). 
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that marked the reservation system in the lower forty-eight states.78 
ANCs are intended to be economically independent, viable 
corporations, governed by predominantly Native shareholders, who 
have ultimate authority over the use of their own land and resources.79 
Unlike Tribes with reservation land held in trust by the federal 
government, ANCs own their own land outright and can sell, trade or 
develop their land openly, without having to obtain the consent or 
approval of the BIA.80 Having no tribal “sovereign immunity” has often 
proved to be a competitive advantage, as ANCs do not have to waive 
sovereign immunity in order to engage in commercial transactions on 
the open market, as some Tribal corporations must do.81 
Moreover, Congress granted ANCs certain legal rights and 
exemptions that are designed to further their mission of providing 
economic and cultural benefits to their Alaska Native shareholders.82 
These rights and exemptions only partially overlap with the rights and 
exemptions granted to Tribes—making the development and 
application of Native law inconsistent and frequently uncertain with 
respect to ANCs and Tribes. 
These generalities also tend to gloss over the challenges Alaska 
Natives have faced adjusting to the Congressional mandate that forced 
them to adopt a non-Native corporate business model as a means to 
preserve their traditional lands, resources, and subsistence way of life.83 
The differences between the ANCs and Tribes are seen most strikingly 
 
 78.  See Native Vill. of Venetie, 522 U.S. at 534 (noting the primary purposes 
behind ANSCA were to increase self-determination and end paternalism). 
 79.  See id. at 532–33 (determining that ANCSA land is not under the 
superintendence of the Federal Government and explaining that ANCs are free 
to convey the land or use it for non-Indian purposes). 
 80.  See Simpson, supra note 56, at 37 (explaining that ANC land “can be 
sold, mortgaged, or developed just like any other private land”). 
 81.  See id. (explaining that it is easier to do business with ANCSA 
corporations because they are not subject to sovereign immunity). 
 82.  See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1620 (2012) (granting tax exemptions on land and 
income for specified periods of time to encourage economic development); § 
1626(e) (2012) (granting minority and economically disadvantaged status to 
ANCs and their majority-owned subsidiaries). 
 83.  See, e.g., LINXWILER, supra note 29 at 46–47 (summarizing many of the 
difficulties with ANCSA during the first twenty years). These challenges 
included massive litigation and legislative amendments which depleted 
resources as well as the unwise distribution of large sums of money to 
inexperienced Alaska Native managers which resulted in business mistakes and 
fraud. Additionally, political instability plagued corporations as they struggled 
with the imposition of cultural and political contests not normally associated 
with for-profit corporations. This instability and the unclear impact on Alaska 
Native sovereignty caused tension with local Alaska tribal entities which were 
disenfranchised from ownership of Alaska Native lands. Id. 
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in the tremendous economic growth and impact the ANCs have had on 
the state of Alaska and the national economy over the last forty years.84 
The jobs and benefits ANCs have provided for their own shareholders 
and for the broader state and national economy are self-evident and 
prove that the great experiment of ANCSA has been successful in 
achieving some important Native economic development goals. The task 
is far from over, however, and the ANCs face difficult challenges ahead 
as they work to bring economic freedom and cultural support to the next 
generation of shareholders. To that end, ANCs must be free to take full 
advantage of the statutory exemptions and federal programs designated 
by Congress to assist them. 
II.  THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK TO PROMOTE 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Given the vast stretches of Alaska without roads or even minimal 
commercial infrastructure,85 the ANCs’ mission of developing a cash-
based economy for the benefit of shareholders is truly a daunting task. 
Lack of infrastructure, limited availability of basic utilities, and inflated 
oil and gas prices have only complicated the task.86 
These challenges have made federal administration and 
distribution of ANCSA land entitlements agonizingly slow. Distribution 
of land is still incomplete after more than forty years of dedicated effort 
by the federal Bureau of Land Management.87 Even when an ANC is 
entitled to receive land, the cost to survey and subdivide large tracts of 
land located off the road system into parcels that can be booked as 
financial assets remains cost-prohibitive.88 
 
 84.  See ALASKA BUS. MONTHLY, supra note 2, at 96–106 (showing that ANCs 
made up eight of the top ten Alaskan-owned and operated companies in the 
state, based on 2012 gross revenues). 
 85.  See Elisia Gatmen Kupris, Protection of our Elderly: A Multidisciplinary 
Collaborative Solution for Alaska, 30 ALASKA L. REV. 47, 60 (2013) (stating that 
approximately seventy percent of Alaska is inaccessible by road and explaining 
that transportation difficulties may hamper commerce). 
 86.  How do you create economic opportunity for shareholders born and 
raised in rural villages where the only way in or out nine months of the year is 
by small plane or snow machine? Where water, sewer, and power distribution 
has only recently become available for residential and commercial use—if it is 
available at all? Where winter temperatures can plunge to eighty degrees below 
zero and the price of gasoline and heating fuel is double and triple the price in 
the lower forty-eight states? 
 87.  Andrew Jensen, ANCSA Land Conveyances Crawl Along, ALASKA J. OF 
COMMERCE, June 17, 2011, available at http://classic.alaskajournal.com/ 
stories/061711/ANC_alcca.shtml. 
 88.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RCED-84-14, REPORT TO THE 
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ALASKA LAND CONVEYANCE PROGRAM—A SLOW, 
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A.  Congress Exempts ANCs from Title VII 
Congress recognized that ANCs needed assistance to properly 
benefit their Alaska Native Shareholders economically and socially, and 
therefore provided a statutory exemption. Section 1626(g) of ANCSA 
exempts ANCs from the definition of an “employer” under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.89 Legislative history reflects that the 
purpose for this amendment was to allow ANCs to adopt shareholder 
hiring preferences without facing employment discrimination charges.90 
The House Report explained that ANCSA needed to “clarify that Native 
corporations can hire their own shareholders without discrimination.”91 
ANCs were therefore excluded from the definition of “employer” when 
Title VII’s definition was adopted.92 
B.  Statutory Limits to ANCs Preferential Treatment 
The problem, however, is that most federal and state laws do not 
exclude or exempt ANCs from coverage. For example, even if a state or 
federal remedial statute does not apply to an ANC, contracting 
provisions or grants may incorporate Equal Employment Opportunity 
laws or related provisions. Perhaps the best known instance is Executive 
Order 11246, which prohibits unlawful employment discrimination by 
federal contractors performing more than $10,000 in government 
business and mandates that contractors adopt affirmative action 
 
COMPLEX, AND COSTLY PROCESS 24 (1984) (describing the cost of surveying 
ANCSA land as a costly administrative obstacle to land management). See 
Jensen, supra note 86 (explaining that without land surveyance and a patented 
claim, there is no true accounting of the acres conveyed). 
 89.  43 U.S.C. § 1626(g) (2012). ANCSA corporations and related 
partnerships, joint ventures, trusts, or affiliates in which an Alaska Native 
Corporation owns not less than twenty-five percent of the equity are exempt 
from Title VII’s definition of employer. Id. 
 90.  See Alaska Land Status Technical Corrections Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 
102-415, § 11, 106 Stat. 2112, 2115 (substituting the definition of employer as a 
means to avoid conflict with the 1964 Civil Rights Act). ANCSA was amended 
“to clarify that Alaska Native corporations, like Indian tribes, are exempt from 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act,” thereby allowing “Alaska Native corporations, 
partnerships, joint ventures, trusts or affiliates in which the Native corporation 
owns not less than 25 per cent of the equity to hire their shareholders or other 
Alaska Natives without discrimination under the Civil Rights Act.” H. REP. NO. 
102-673, at 19 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450, 1456. 
 91.  H. REP. NO. 102-673, at 15. 
 92.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(2)(B) (adopting Title VII’s definition of employer 
in § 2000(e)(b)). The Genetic Information Nondisclosure Act (GINA) explicitly 
adopts Title VII’s definition of employer, which technically exempts ANCs from 
GINA restrictions. However, this is likely an oversight rather than by design. 
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programs.93 Federal, state, or local government contracts may include 
other provisions that directly or indirectly affect ANC contractors’ 
hiring policies. 
More directly, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) defines 
employer in terms comparable to Title VII, and expressly exempts 
Indian Tribes from its definition of employer, but does not expressly 
incorporate Title VII’s definition.94 Consequently, courts have held that 
ANCs are not exempt from ADA claims.95 The Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act and the Equal Pay Act, however, do not exclude or 
exempt Indian Tribes, ANCs, or businesses located on or near an Indian 
Reservation.96 
State law does not exempt ANCs. In particular, the Alaska Human 
Rights Act,97 does not exclude Indian Tribes or ANCSA corporations.98 
The Alaska State Commission for Human Rights (ASCHR) takes the 
position that it may assert jurisdiction over ANCSA corporations.99 
However, ASCHR recognizes that Indian Tribes are entitled to sovereign 
immunity, and also recognizes ANC shareholder preferences.100 
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, is a separate 
statutory basis for prosecuting an employment race discrimination 
claim.101 The Tenth Circuit has issued an opinion suggesting that Title 
VII’s express exemption operates to preclude liability from being 
imposed in any related context.102 This supports an argument that ANCs 
are not subject to § 1981. However, the Fourth Circuit has conversely 
 
 93.  Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965). 
 94.  42 U.S.C. § 12111(5). 
 95.  See Pearson v. Chugach Gov’t Servs., 669 F. Supp.2d 467, 476 (D. Del. 
2009) (holding that ANCs retain liability under the ADA). 
 96.  See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (listing ADEA definition of employer); § 203(d) 
(listing Federal Labor Standards Act definition of employer which governs the 
Equal Pay Act). 
 97.  ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (2013). 
 98.  See § 18.80.300(5) (definition of “employer” for the Alaska Human 
Rights Act does not provide explicit ANC or Indian Tribe exemption). 
 99.  See ASCHR v. Eyak Vill. Corp., ASCHR C-87-105, C-88-85, C-88-76 
(1991) (taking the stance that ANCs are restricted by federal and state anti-
discrimination provisions). 
 100.  See Mortenson v. Alutiiq Mgmt. Servs., ASCHR C-04-095 (2005) 
(recognizing ANC prerogative in shareholder preferential treatment). See also 
Pankowski v. Cominco Alaska, ASCHR C-91-093 (1993) (deeming ANC 
shareholder preferential treatment appropriate). 
 101.  See Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975) (holding that 
remedies under Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 are “separate, distinct, 
and independent”). 
 102.  See Wardle v. Ute Indian Tribe, 623 F.2d 670, 672–73 (10th Cir. 1980) 
(determining that the specific exemption of Indian Tribes from compliance in 
Title VII control the broad, general civil rights provisions which do not speak to 
the issue). 
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held that ANCs are subject to § 1981 claims.103 In one recent case, the 
District of Alaska agreed with the Fourth Circuit, refusing to read an 
exemption for ANCs into § 1981 when there is a reasonable explanation 
as to why a difference may exist as to ANC exemption status under § 
1981 as opposed to Title VII.104 The Ninth Circuit has not resolved this 
question. 
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) does not include an 
express exemption for ANCs or Indian Tribes.105 Therefore, courts have 
noted that ANCs are subject to FMLA.106 Neither the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) nor the Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA) 
include an express exemption for ANCs, corporations, or Indian 
Tribes;107 therefore, ANCs are subject to these laws. 
C.  Shareholder Preferences 
Because most state and federal laws apply to ANCs, shareholder 
preferences are the only tool that ANCs may wield to protect ANCSA’s 
goal of promoting the health, welfare, and economic well-being of ANC 
shareholders. ASCHR has approved ANC shareholder preferences in 
response to state claims under the Alaska Human Rights Act.108 Two 
problems, however, remain. 
First, there is no functional model to explain how shareholder 
preferences operate. Are shareholder preferences an affirmative defense 
or part of the manner by which we analyze claims? To use the 
McDonnell Douglas test as an example,109 should we construe 
 
 103.  Aleman v. Chugach Support Servs., Inc., 485 F.3d 206, 210–11 (4th Cir. 
2007). The court noted that Title VII limits exclusions to Title VII itself and that § 
1981 includes no such exemption for ANCs. Id. 
 104.  See Becker v. Kikiktagruk Inupiat Corp., No. 3:09-cv-00015-TMB, slip op. 
at 9–10 (D. Alaska Aug. 12, 2010) (holding that ANCs are not immune from suit 
under § 1981). The court adopted the reasoning in Aleman that Title VII’s more 
expansive obligations would provide a reasonable explanation. Id. 
 105.  See Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4) (2012) (defining 
“employer” for purposes of FMLA). 
 106.  See Pearson v. Chugach Gov’t Servs., 669 F. Supp.2d 467, 476–77 (D. Del. 
2009) (noting that there is no express exemption for ANCs and therefore holding 
that ANCs are subject to FMLA). 
 107.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d)–(e) (2006) (FLSA definition of employer); ALASKA 
STAT. § 23.10.145 (2013) (AWHA adopting FLSA definitions); § 23.10.060(d)(1) 
(exempting certain types of employees, not including ANC employees, from the 
overtime provisions of AWHA). 
 108.  Mortenson v. Alutiiq Management Servs., ASCHR C-04-095 (2005); 
Pankowski v. Cominco Alaska, ASCHR C-91-093 (1993). 
 109.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) 
(establishing a framework for Title VII cases). The McDonnell Douglas test is a 
three-step test used to analyze disparate treatment employment discrimination 
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shareholder preferences as constituting a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason supporting an adverse employment action? Or are shareholder 
preferences something else, something along the lines of implied 
preemption? As of yet, no court has come to grips with this issue, 
leaving the law unsettled. 
The second problem is more immediate: ensuring that the policy is 
a shareholder preference policy and that it is not applied in a manner 
that might give rise to any unlawful discrimination or retaliation claims. 
Put differently, when is a shareholder preference policy valid? 
The Ninth Circuit has twice issued unpublished memoranda 
dispositions in which it noted that an ANC shareholder policy involved 
in a case was not facially discriminatory. Each time, the court avoided 
analyzing the extent to which the shareholder preference was 
permissible, relying instead on the appellant’s failure to establish a 
prima facie case of employment discrimination.110 In other words, the 
court did not hold that the shareholder policy was valid, did not base its 
decision on the shareholder policy, and it did not offer any instructive 
insights into how we should view such preferences.111 
More recently in Becker v. Kikiktagruk Inupiat Corporation,112 the 
Ninth Circuit decided a case that raised concerns related to a 
shareholder preference policy. However, instead of litigating the 
shareholder preference, the case focused on a § 1981 claim of retaliation 
against Kikiktagruk Inupiat Corporation (KIC).113 Becker argued that he 
was fired after refusing to follow KIC’s shareholder preference in his 
hiring activities.114 The district court concluded that KIC could be subject 
to a § 1981 retaliation claim notwithstanding the ANC exemption from 
 
claims where there is no direct evidence of discrimination. First, the plaintiff 
must establish a prima facie case by showing that he or she was a member of a 
protected class, that he or she was qualified for the position, that he or she 
suffered an adverse employment action, and that the employer continued to 
seek applicants with the same qualifications. Second, the employer may rebut 
the plaintiff’s case by showing that there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the challenged decision. Third, the plaintiff may seek to rebut or 
refute the employer’s explanation by showing that it lacks credibility; that is, 
that the employer’s stated reason for its action is pretextual. Id. 
 110.  Conitz v. Teck Alaska Inc, 331 F. App’x 512, 513 (9th Cir. 2009); Conitz v. 
Teck Alaska, Inc., 433 F. App’x 580, 580–81 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 111.  See Conitz v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights, No. S-14357, 
2014 WL 895205, at *1–2 (Alaska 2014) (discussing the scope of preceding Ninth 
Circuit decisions). 
 112.  Becker v. Kikiktagruk Inupiat Corp., 488 F. App’x 227 (9th Cir. 2012). 
Mr. Fisher’s firm represented KIC in this case, but Mr. Fisher was not involved 
in the case or its appeal. 
 113.  Id. at 228–29. 
 114.  Becker v. Kikiktagruk Inupiat Corp., No. 3:09-cv-00015-TMB, slip op. at 
4 (D. Alaska Aug. 12, 2010). 
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Title VII.115 However, the district court granted KIC summary judgment 
after it determined that Becker could not have reasonably believed that 
the shareholder preference was unlawful because it was facially neutral 
and he never sought clarification from anyone.116 
The Ninth Circuit reversed Becker in an unpublished memorandum 
disposition. In reversing, the court did not reach the merits regarding 
whether or not the shareholder policy was valid. Instead, the court 
simply concentrated on the test for retaliation—whether Becker 
reasonably believed that the shareholder policy was racially 
discriminatory.117 
Analyzing the retaliation claim, the Becker court concluded that 
there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether or not 
Becker reasonably believed he was opposing an unlawful policy based 
on six considerations: (1) KIC’s handbook specifically stated that 
“Native preference is given in all hiring actions”; (2) meetings were held 
where shareholder and Native hiring preferences were discussed; (3) 
KIC’s Human Resources personnel became upset when Becker hired a 
Caucasian employee; (4) Becker thought some employees were being 
reclassified from shareholder to non-shareholder based on their race 
(when in fact it was because these shareholders did not fit the definition 
of shareholders eligible for the preference); (5) Becker was required to 
keep track of all hires and record whether they were shareholders or 
“Other Native”; and (6) every employee subject to the shareholder 
preference was, in fact, an Alaska Native.118 In reversing, the court noted 
only that these factors established a prima facie case sufficient to 
overcome summary judgment and did not ultimately determine 
whether Becker’s belief was rational.119 
The result in Becker underscores an additional problem for ANCs. 
Employment discrimination claims are related to, but different from, 
retaliation claims; that is, a valid retaliation claim does not depend upon 
a valid underlying discrimination claim.120 Instead, a valid retaliation 
claim only requires that the employee reasonably believe that the 
underlying act was unlawful.121 Consequently, shareholder preferences 
can actually open the door to additional risks for ANCs as employees 
 
 115.  See id. at 11–12. 
 116.  Id at 12. 
 117.  Becker v. Kikiktagruk Inupiat Corp., 488 F. App’x 227, 229 (9th Cir. 
2012). 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Luce Forward, 303 F.3d 994, 
1005 (9th Cir. 2002) (enumerating the requirements for a valid retaliation claim). 
 121.  Id. 
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who reasonably believe that they have been adversely impacted by a 
shareholder preference may be able to prosecute retaliation claims. 
 
D.  ANC Shareholder Status as a “Political” Rather than a “Racial” 
Classification 
Becker highlights the tension between a true shareholder preference, 
which is usually analyzed as a political or an economic classification 
subject to rational basis review, and a racial classification, potentially 
subject to heightened scrutiny. This tension, central to ANCs’ efforts to 
protect shareholder hiring, was first explored in Morton v. Mancari.122 
There, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an Indian employment 
preference for positions with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, subjecting the 
preference to rational basis review after it classified the preference as 
implicating a political rather than a racial classification.123 The Court 
emphasized that “the preference applies only to employment in the 
Indian service.”124 The Court further qualified its holding by observing 
that “[t]he preference does not cover any other Government agency or 
activity, and we need not consider the obviously more difficult question 
that would be presented by a blanket exemption for Indians from all 
civil service examinations.”125 
Since 1974, however, courts have been careful in applying Mancari, 
and it has been strongly suggested that its analysis was dictated by its 
specific facts (a hiring preference for Indians with respect to a federal 
agency responsible for Indian affairs).126 In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena,127 the U.S. Supreme Court held that minority contracting 
preferences were subject to strict scrutiny.128 Because the minority 
 
 122.  417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
 123.  Id. at 553–55. 
 124.  Id. at 554. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 428 U.S. 495, 519–20 (2000) (emphasizing that 
the political-racial distinction in Mancari was limited to the authority of the BIA); 
Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 154 
F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 1998) (interpreting Mancari to apply only to the special 
case of the Bureau of Indian Affairs executing a hiring preference for Indian 
applicants and therefore not protecting employment discrimination on the basis 
of membership in a particular tribe from a national origin discrimination claim); 
Malabad v. N. Slope Borough, 42 F. Supp. 2d 927, 937 (D. Alaska 1999) (“Mancari 
is based on the relationship between sovereign governments; that is, Indian 
tribes and the federal government. . . . The Ninth Circuit interprets Mancari as 
shielding only those statutes that affect uniquely Indian interests.”). 
 127.  515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 128.  Id. at 227. 
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contracting preference in question included Native Americans, the 
opinion has been interpreted by some as suggesting that the “political 
classification” analysis of Mancari is subject to doubt.129 Whether this is a 
correct reading of Adarand Constructors has not been established. 
Closer to home, in Williams v. Babbitt,130 the Ninth Circuit held that 
an Indian preference regarding reindeer herding implicated a racial, and 
not a political, classification because the underlying activity was not 
related to unique matters concerning Tribal sovereignty or self-
governance.131 The court rejected arguments that the preference was 
simply a political classification based on Mancari.132 
However, in American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO 
v. United States,133 the District of Columbia Circuit applied Mancari’s 
political classification analysis to uphold a defense appropriation act’s 
preference for outsourcing to firms that claimed fifty-one percent or 
more Native American ownership.134 The court reasoned that, in context, 
the preference was being applied in connection with the federal 
government’s constitutional authority to regulate commerce with 
tribes.135 
Similarly, in Artichoke Joe’s California Grand Casino v. Norton,136 the 
Ninth Circuit held that challenges to state and federal laws that allowed 
certain forms of gambling only on Indian tribal lands were subject to 
rational basis review as a political classification.137 The court’s reasoning 
seemed based on the fact that a federal law was involved that related to 
Congress’ trust obligations towards Indians.138 But in Dawavendewa v. 
Salt River Project,139 the Ninth Circuit held that a tribal preference 
favoring one tribe over another tribe implicated a national origin, and 
not a political classification.140 
Finally, in Malabed v. North Slope Borough,141 the District of Alaska 
held that the North Slope Borough’s employment preference was subject 
to strict scrutiny as a racial and not a political classification because, in 
 
 129.  Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 130.  115 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 131.  Id. at 664. 
 132.  See id. (pointing out that the preference in question would be broader 
than any other preference upheld under Mancari). 
 133.  330 F.3d 513 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 134.  Id. at 517–23. 
 135.  Id. at 521. 
 136.  353 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 137.  Id. at 735. 
 138.  See id. at 729 (explaining the historical origin of the trust doctrine). 
 139.  154 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 140.  Id. at 1121. 
 141.  42 F. Supp. 2d 927 (D. Alaska 1999). 
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adopting the preference, the North Slope Borough was acting as a state 
government political subdivision.142 The Ninth Circuit affirmed on state 
law grounds after the Alaska Supreme Court confirmed that state law 
applied through certification proceedings.143 
Based on these cases, an Indian employment or contracting 
preference will be classified as a “political classification” if it relates to a 
federal law touching upon Tribal matters and implicating the federal 
government’s trust responsibilities or the federal government’s 
authority to regulate commerce with Tribes. Other preferences will be 
classified as racial and not political classifications, and will be subject to 
strict scrutiny. 
In contrast to Native American employment preferences, 
preferences anchored to neutral criteria stand a much better chance of 
surviving scrutiny. If, for example, shareholder employment preferences 
are characterized as political or economic preferences (and not racial), 
one would think there would be less concern with the scope and content 
of such preferences. As the District of Alaska correctly noted in one case, 
non-Indians may be ANCSA shareholders.144 
The catch, however, is ensuring that the policy is a shareholder 
preference policy, and that it is not applied in a manner that might give 
rise to any discrimination or retaliation claims. For example, if a 
shareholder preference is simply a proxy for race discrimination, it is 
clear that the preference will support employment discrimination 
claims.145 Moreover, current precedent instructs that employment 
preferences implicating a protected classification may constitute 
impermissible discrimination if the preferences are adopted and applied 
by an employer covered by state or federal law and no statutory 
exemption applies.146 To illustrate, if an employer not exempted from 
coverage adopted an employment preference for Alaska Natives, such a 
preference could possibly be struck down as a racial classification. 
Moreover, an otherwise valid shareholder preference may be applied in 
a discriminatory manner (for example, if it could be shown that the 
 
 142.  Id. at 939. 
 143.  Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 335 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 144.  See Conitz v. Teck Alaska Inc., No. 4:09-cv-0020-RRB, slip op. at 9 (D. 
Alaska Nov. 4, 2009) (noting that there are ANCSA shareholders who are not 
Alaska Natives). 
 145.  See Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697 F.2d 1297, 1303–04 (9th Cir. 
1982) (rejecting shareholder preference plan that had the effect of discriminating 
along the lines of race, color, or national origin). 
 146.  See Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project, 154 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 
1998) (declining to read the Indian Preferences exemption so broadly as to 
permit an employment preference of one tribe over another and concluding that 
the preference violated Title VII because no exemption applied). 
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preference was denied to non-Natives who were also shareholders).147 
Permissive as opposed to mandatory preferences are easier to 
defend and enforce because permissive preferences simply use a given 
status as a factor to weigh and consider along with all other relevant 
factors when making employment or contracting decisions.148 
Preferences that are linked to neutral criteria (such as shareholder 
preferences) are also easier to defend and enforce.149 
III.  ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING ANCS 
In enacting ANCSA, Congress sought a new solution to long-
standing problems affecting Native Americans. ANCSA’s purpose was 
to promote the health, well-being, and economic development of 
Alaskan Natives by adopting a private corporation model to administer 
settlement rights.150 One important plank established that ANCs should 
be allowed to adopt shareholder preferences without fear of facing 
employment discrimination claims. However, forty years after ANCSA 
was enacted, ANCs are confronted with a bewildering array of state and 
federal remedial laws that are inconsistently applied. The protection 
afforded to ANCs by section 1626(g) of ANCSA is essentially 
meaningless because courts are allowing race discrimination claims to 
proceed under § 1981 of the United States Code or under state 
statutes.151 In other contexts, shareholder preferences offer uncertain 
 
 147.  Apart from shareholder preferences adopted under ANCSA, the Indian 
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEA) confers a separate 
statutory exemption related to federal contracts with tribal organizations, and 
mandates that contracts shall include “to the greatest extent feasible” that Indian 
preferences be recognized for training, employment, and subcontracts. 25 U.S.C. 
§ 450e(b) (2012). Amendments enacted in 1994 further provide that a Tribe’s 
employment preference laws should be honored with respect to covered federal 
contracts. See § 450e(c) (requiring to the greatest extent feasible preferences to 
Indians for federal contracts). Indian preferences adopted under ISDEA have 
been upheld. See Alaska Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors v. Pierce, 694 F.2d 
1162 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding regulations providing for Alaska Native 
preference in contracting for Alaska Native housing projects). 
 148.  Cf. Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protections and the Special Relationship: 
The Case of Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE L.J. 537, 594 (1996) (noting that using 
status as a Native Hawaiian as a mandatory factor as opposed to one of a 
number of factors would make reversal more likely). 
 149.  James P. Mills, Note, The Use of Hiring Preferences by Alaska Native 
Corporations After Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 403, 432–33 
(2005). 
 150.  See generally Simpson, supra note 56, at 37–38 (describing the ways in 
which ANCSA’s corporate model provides unique advantages). 
 151.  See infra Part III.A (discussing disadvantages of section 1621(g) of 
ANCSA). 
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help because precedent continues to develop regarding when, and 
whether, such preferences are political or economic in nature as opposed 
to racial or some other basis subject to heightened scrutiny. Without 
clarity in the law, the means Congress provided to aid ANCs in 
accomplishing their economic and cultural support mission is 
increasingly endangered. 
A.  Congressional Action: Most Direct, but an Unlikely Option 
The current legal landscape presents a confusing picture for ANCs. 
On the one hand, Congress clearly intended ANCs to be excluded from 
the definition of “employer” for purposes of Title VII so that they could 
adopt shareholder preferences without fear of employment 
discrimination suits.152 On the other hand, Congress neglected to extend 
this same exclusion to other federal remedial statutes. Perhaps worse, 
nothing prevents state or local anti-discrimination statutes from being 
asserted against ANCs. If those fail, plaintiffs may attempt to claim 
reliance on § 1981 for a race discrimination claim. The end result 
frustrates the Congressional intent underlying § 1626(g). ANCs find 
themselves confronted with claims in a variety of employment-related 
contexts that undermine their ability to manage their workforce in a way 
designed to promote the health, welfare, and economic well-being of 
shareholders. 
The most efficient solution to the current problem would be for 
Congress to amend ANCSA in three ways. First, the exemption in § 
1626(g) should be clarified to ensure that ANCs are exempted from the 
definition of “employer” for all federal anti-discrimination legislation. 
Second, ANCSA should be amended to expressly preempt any state or 
local anti-discrimination statute that acts in derogation of the § 1626(g) 
exemption. Express preemption is the most direct and efficient manner 
by which Congress could prevent application of state or local laws that 
threaten to erode § 1626(g). Third and finally, Congress should amend § 
1981 to exempt or exclude ANCs from race discrimination claims based 
on the application of shareholder preferences. 
Admittedly, it is unlikely that Congress would, or perhaps even 
could, take any such corrective steps, given the gridlock in recent years. 
Notwithstanding their considerable economic successes and increasing 
corporate sophistication, some ANCs are not schooled in Beltway 
lobbying. Moreover, a wave of anti-ANC sentiment has gripped a small, 
 
 152.  Pearson v. Chugach Gov’t Servs. Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 467, 471–72 (D. 
Del. 2009). 
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but powerful, segment of Congress.153 Prospects of an overhaul of 
ANCSA seem remote, at best. 
B.  Judicial Resolution 
In contrast to legislative action, judicial resolution is more 
promising. Courts frequently encounter ANC-related issues and have 
previously developed guidelines for resolving these issues against an 
uncertain and ill-defined statutory backdrop. For example, courts 
holding that ANCs are subject to § 1981 employment race discrimination 
claims have correctly noted that § 1981 is a separate statutory scheme 
advancing related but different goals and subject to less-rigorous 
procedural rules than those which created ANCs.154 Unlike Title VII 
claims, plaintiffs need not administratively exhaust § 1981 claims. 
Moreover, Title VII addresses other forms of employment 
discrimination than race. Perhaps most importantly, only Title VII 
includes an express exemption from its rules for ANCs.155 Section 1981 
includes no express exemption. The content and structure of § 1981 and 
Title VII support the conclusion reached by the Fourth Circuit and the 
Alaska District Court that ANCS are not exempted from § 1981 race 
discrimination claims. 
However, Congress clearly intended that ANCs be allowed to rely 
upon shareholder preferences without fear of employment 
discrimination claims. Section 1981 includes no express prohibition on 
retaliation, yet courts have reasonably implied such a right.156 
Consequently, there is no substantive reason why a right to rely on 
shareholder preferences should not also be implied in § 1981 actions. 
And, as already seen, courts appear ready to accept this premise, and to 
allow ANCs to rely upon shareholder preferences as a sort of implied 
defense to § 1981 claims.157 
C.  Proposed Two-Part Test for Analyzing Shareholder Preferences 
The recognition that ANCs may rely upon shareholder preferences 
 
 153.  See Allison, supra note 67, at 881 (discussing critics of ANCs in Congress 
and their objections). 
 154.  See Aleman v. Chugach Support Servs., Inc., 485 F.3d 206, 212 (4th Cir. 
2007) (differentiating obligations under § 1981 and Title VII). 
 155.  See supra Part II.A. 
 156.  See CBOCS v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 446–48 (2008) (recognizing 
retaliation claim under § 1981). 
 157.  See supra Part II.D. See also Conitz v. Teck Cominco Alaska, Inc., No. 
4:06-cv-0015-RRB, slip op. at 4 (D. Alaska July 21, 2008). 
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when facing an employment race discrimination claim filed under § 
1981 or some other basis such as state law, serves as an analytical first 
step. In situations where there is no statutory exemption or exception for 
ANCs, courts should of course allow the claim to proceed. However, 
courts should honor the Congressional mandate underlying section 
1626(g) of ANCSA by allowing ANCs to rely upon permissible forms of 
shareholder preferences. 
We argue that a two-part test should be adopted. The first step 
would be to determine if the shareholder preference was valid. The 
second step would be to apply the shareholder preference to the specific 
claim at issue to determine whether or not the claim would be allowed 
to proceed. We address each step in turn. 
1. Step One: Is There a Valid Shareholder Preference? 
 
Determining whether or not the first step is satisfied should involve 
an analysis of the preference. Labels should not control. Just because a 
preference is called a “shareholder” preference should not preclude 
further inquiry. If there is evidence that a shareholder preference is 
being used as a proxy for race discrimination, or for purposes 
antithetical to advancing the economic well-being of ANC shareholders, 
then the preference should not insulate ANCs from discrimination or 
other employment-related claims. Racial discrimination is not consistent 
with ANC Native cultural values that promote tolerance and value 
community sharing.158 However, a neutrally adopted and neutrally 
applied shareholder preference should be analyzed no differently than 
any other economic or political justification. It should be viewed as a 
legitimate, non-discriminatory justification to support an employment–
related decision. The protection should extend to both disparate 
treatment and disparate impact claims. 
Relevant factors could include the following: (1) whether the 
shareholder preference was properly adopted by a duly constituted 
Board; (2) whether the shareholder preference is neutral on its face; (3) 
whether the shareholder preference has been applied in a uniform, 
consistent, and nondiscriminatory manner; (4) whether the shareholder 
preference promotes § 1626(g)’s goals to advance the health, welfare, 
and economic well-being of shareholders; (5) whether the shareholder 
preference is, in context, independent of any other hiring or 
 
 158.  For statements of various Alaska Native Tribes’ cultural values, consult 
the Alaska Native Knowledge Network, available at 
http://www.ankn.uaf.edu/ANCR/Values, and click on the individual tribal 
links at the bottom of that page. 
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employment preference; (6) whether there are any facts suggesting that 
the shareholder preference is being applied as a proxy for race or in an 
impermissible manner; and (7) whether application of the shareholder 
preference would undermine ANCSA’s fundamental goals. 
These represent a non-exclusive range of factors that could be used 
to evaluate whether or not a shareholder preference was valid. No one 
factor would be dispositive. Instead, it is assumed that courts would 
adopt a context-sensitive analysis to evaluate the totality of the 
circumstances. Conceivably, there might be cases where an otherwise 
valid shareholder preference could be struck down because, in the 
specific context of the case at hand, its application would undermine 
ANCSA’s fundamental goals. However, that would likely constitute a 
rare case. In most situations, an objectively neutral shareholder 
preference that was consistent with § 1626(g) and was applied in a 
uniform, consistent manner would be upheld. The first step would 
therefore be satisfied. 
2. Step Two: Analyzing the Preference Against the Claim at Issue 
 
Assuming the first step is satisfied, that a valid shareholder 
preference exists, how should one define its scope? The second step 
would analyze the specific claim at issue in the context of the 
shareholder preference. Should the claim being alleged be precluded by 
the shareholder preference? An existing test used in Indian Law could 
be adopted to analyze the application of ANC shareholder preferences. 
In the absence of an express Congressional statement, courts have 
adopted a three-part test to determine when a statute of general 
applicability will not apply to Indian Tribes or tribal entities: (1) the law 
touches upon purely internal matters related to the tribe’s self-
governance (operating a housing authority or health centers are 
examples); (2) application of the law would abrogate rights guaranteed 
by treaties; or (3) there is proof that Congress did not intend the law to 
apply to Indian Tribes.159 
Although one must be careful to distinguish ANCs from tribal 
corporations, it is useful to address principles governing tribal entities 
because those principles form an interpretative backdrop to 
Congressional intent underlying certain ANCSA goals. As noted, 
although ANCs are set up in a manner evoking the rights and 
responsibilities of private corporations, the analogue has never been 
 
 159.  Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 
1071, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 
751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
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precise. Instead, a driving force behind ANCSA was and remains an 
expressed goal that ANCs would promote the health and economic 
well-being of their shareholders. This is conceptually similar to the 
federal government’s trust responsibilities owed to Indian tribes and 
tribal entities. We believe, therefore, that this test provides a useful 
starting point for developing a similar test to be used for shareholder 
preferences. 
To illustrate the test in operation, in Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission v. Karuk Tribe Housing Authority,160 the Ninth Circuit held 
that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not apply to an 
individual’s employment relationship with the Karuk Tribe Housing 
Authority because it touched upon purely internal matters related to the 
tribe’s self-governance.161 Applying the three-part test, the court’s 
analysis focused on the fact that the housing authority functioned as an 
arm of tribal government to provide an essential service to tribal 
members (affordable housing), and the dispute was wholly between a 
tribal member and the tribe.162 
A comparable result was reached in Penobscot Nation v. Fellencer,163 
where the First Circuit held that an Indian Tribe was entitled to rely on 
sovereign immunity precluding suit in state court alleging state 
employment discrimination claims because the employment decisions 
are internal tribal matters and therefore enjoy limited immunity.164 
In Pink v. Modoc Indian Health Project, Inc.,165 the Ninth Circuit held, 
in part, that Title VII’s exemption for Indian Tribes included a nonprofit 
health organization incorporated by two tribes.166 The non-profit was 
not itself a Tribe and so did not qualify for the Tribal exemption. 
However, the court likened the tribal health organization to an arm of 
the sovereign tribes and ruled that the Tribal exemption applied.167 
Dille v. Council of Energy Resource Tribes168 reached a similar result. 
There, the Tenth Circuit held that a Tribal energy council organized by 
thirty-nine Indian Tribes could avail itself of Title VII’s exemption for 
Indian Tribes.169 The court determined that Title VII’s exemption was 
enacted to give Indian Tribes greater control over their economic 
 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. at 1080–81. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  164 F.3d 706 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 164.  Id. at 708. 
 165.  157 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 166.  Id. at 1188. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  801 F.2d 373 (10th Cir. 1986). 
 169.  Id. at 374–75. 
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enterprises.170 
With respect to federal or state wage and hour law, the same three-
part test has been applied. Relevant factors include the nature of the 
business, its location, the extent to which it serves non-Indian as well as 
Indian customers, whether it employs non-Indians as well as Indians, 
whether goods and services enter interstate commerce, and the degree to 
which the business or entity relates to tribal self-governance. 
For example, in Snyder v. Navajo Nation,171 the Ninth Circuit held 
that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) did not apply to Tribal law 
enforcement officers because law enforcement touched upon the Tribe’s 
exclusive rights of self-governance in an intramural affair.172 However, a 
different result was reached in Solis v. Matheson,173 where the Ninth 
Circuit held that the FLSA did apply to a business selling tobacco and 
other products on reservation land because, although it was owned by 
Tribal members and was located on the reservation, it did not relate to a 
purely internal matter, as it employed and sold out-of-state products to 
both Indians and non-Indians.174 
The same principles have been applied when examining claims 
under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). In National Labor 
Relations Board v. Chapa de Indian Health Program, Inc.,175 the Ninth Circuit 
held that a nonprofit health organization was subject to the NLRA 
because the nonprofit contracted to provide services with non-Indians 
and Indians, was financially independent from the Tribal authority, and 
labor relations was not a subject uniquely related to Tribal self-
governance concerning purely intramural affairs.176 However, in other 
instances where Tribal authorities on reservation land were directly 
involved, courts have held that Indian Tribes could rely on the 
government exemption to the NLRA.177 
A similar three-part test could be used to determine when and 
whether ANCs may rely upon shareholder preferences, or the extent to 
which a law of general applicability should apply to ANCs: (1) whether 
the law directly affects the ANC’s internal governance of its workforce 
related to the Congressional mandate to promote the health, welfare, 
 
 170.  Id. at 375. 
 171.  382 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 172.  Id. at 894. 
 173.  563 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 174.  Id. at 428, 431. 
 175.  316 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 176.  Id. at 1000. 
 177.  See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Pueblo of San Juan, 280 F.3d 1278, 1285–
86 (10th Cir. 2000) (upholding an employment preference for Natives by a non-
Native company that was contractually required as a condition to operating on 
tribal lands). 
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and economic well-being of ANC shareholders; (2) whether application 
of the law abrogates or undermines Congressional intent to allow ANCs 
to adopt shareholder preferences for the health, welfare, and economic 
well-being of its shareholders; or (3) whether there is proof that 
Congress did not intend the law to apply to ANCs. 
A sensitive, flexible analysis of this type would protect the rights 
and interests of ANCs to promote the well-being of their respective 
shareholders without undermining broader societal goals protected by 
federal or state remedial statutes. The benchmark in all instances would 
be a neutral, shareholder-pegged preference that was not linked to any 
racial or ethnic characteristics and that protected each ANC’s interest in 
promoting the economic well-being of its shareholders. If the initial 
inquiry reveals a valid shareholder preference, the analysis shifts to step 
two, analyzing the preference against the claim at issue. 
D.  Examining the Test in Context 
As stated above, we propose a two-part test where the first step is 
to determine whether the shareholder preference is valid and then apply 
the preference to the specific claim at issue and determine whether the 
claim should be allowed to proceed.178 
The test we propose is not rigid. No black and white rule would (or 
should) exist. However, certain general parameters would offer 
predictive guidance to assist ANCs in structuring their workforces. For 
example, in the second part of our proposed test’s two-part analysis, in 
most situations, it is probable that laws dealing with health, benefits, 
safety, or disability leave would still apply to ANCs as the 
Congressional goals underlying those statutes parallel the Congressional 
goal underlying ANCSA. Consequently, the ADA, Family and Medical 
Leave Act, Employment Retirement Income Security Act, and 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration would apply to ANCs 
in probably most, but not all, instances. However, laws addressing 
hiring, discipline, pay, placement, or workforce management would 
probably not apply to ANCs, so long as a permissible shareholder 
preference was adopted. Such laws would conflict with the underlying 
Congressional goal to allow ANCs to adopt shareholder preferences for 
the purposes of promoting the health, welfare, and economic well-being 
of their shareholders. Accordingly, along with Title VII, the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, Equal Pay Act, FLSA, and § 1981 
would not apply to ANCs in most cases. 
 
 178.  See supra Part III.C. 
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E.  Comparing the Proposed Test to Other Existing Analyses 
The test we propose is validated by comparing it to other existing 
analyses. It fits comfortably within long-settled preemption models. For 
example, the underlying principles are comparable to how preemption 
cases are analyzed under the Railway Labor Act. In such cases, claims 
that depend upon an interpretation or application of a collective 
bargaining agreement are preempted under the Railway Labor Act.179 
However, if the claim is independent of the agreement it may proceed.180 
To similar effect, if a claim involved interpretation or analysis or 
application of the shareholder preference, it would also be precluded. 
For example, assuming the existence of a valid shareholder preference, if 
a job applicant filed an ADA claim based on the allegation that he or she 
was not hired for a position based on a disability, the claim should be 
precluded as it would involve an interpretation or analysis or 
application of the shareholder policy. However, if a current employee 
filed a claim alleging that he or she was discharged because of a 
disability, the claim would not involve an interpretation or analysis or 
application of the shareholder policy, and would be allowed to proceed. 
The test we propose is also conceptually related to implied 
preemption cases. In implied preemption cases, state law will be 
precluded when it conflicts with federal law or raises an obstacle to 
Congressional goals or objectives (so-called “conflict preemption”),181 or 
when federal law is so pervasive in a given area that it can be said to 
occupy that field to prevent states from supplementing the law (so-
called “field preemption”).182 Analytically, field preemption is not a 
good fit. However, our proposed test is quite comparable to conflict 
preemption. Congress spoke. It intended § 1626(g) to allow ANCs to 
adopt shareholder preferences to promote the health, welfare, and 
economic well-being of its shareholders. Any law undermining that 
intent should be precluded. The two-step test we propose mirrors this 
aspect of conflict preemption. 
F.  Summarizing the Approach 
As noted, the gate-keeper or first step in all cases would be to first 
ascertain whether a permissible form of shareholder preference existed. 
Assuming this first step was satisfied, courts would then apply the 
 
 179.  Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299, 302–07 (1989). 
 180.  Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 256 (1994). 
 181.  Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000). 
 182.  San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959). 
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three-part test outlined above to determine whether the particular 
statute or regulation in question would apply to the ANC under the 
specific circumstances of the case presented. If it did, that law would be 
precluded or preempted in that particular case. If it did not, then the 
claim could proceed. This approach protects individual rights, protects 
the rights and interests of ANCs, and safeguards Congressional intent as 
evidenced by § 1626(g) to allow ANCs flexibility to promote the health, 
welfare, and economic stability of their shareholders. This approach is 
also consistent with existing judicial analyses, and therefore an approach 
that fits comfortably within a predictable, stable framework for judicial 
administration. 
CONCLUSION 
We began by reviewing solid statistics that demonstrate the 
tremendous positive impact ANCs have had on both the Alaska and 
national economy over the last forty years. The fact that ANCs have 
achieved such growth and power in such a short period of time is a 
testament to the innovative thinking that prompted the federal 
government to approach the Alaska Native land claims settlement with 
the goal of assisting Indians in Alaska to move toward true economic 
and cultural independence, as well as the hard work of countless Alaska 
Natives and others who brought the vision of ANCSA into reality. When 
ANCs prosper, their shareholders, the State of Alaska, and the United 
States all benefit. 
In this Article we have demonstrated that ANCs are a living 
example of how we, as a nation, can learn from mistakes of the past and 
change the future for the better. In this post-economic downturn 
economy, the state and federal government cannot afford to be 
indecisive. We need to consolidate and strengthen the existing legal 
exemptions and exceptions that assist ANCs to prosper. Congress and 
the state legislature must continue to support ANCs toward greater 
economic independence by resolving conflicts in the laws that govern 
Tribes and ANCs. We need clear and consistent laws that protect and 
foster facially neutral ANC shareholder hiring preferences that are 
properly applied and do not result in unlawful racial discrimination. We 
also need to foster better understanding of ANC history and why 
Congress granted ANCs preferences in government contracting, that is, 
to assist thousands of Native shareholders who reside in remote 
communities with little or no cash-based economy. Increasing 
understanding promotes cooperation among small businesses and 
disadvantaged minorities. Clarity and consistency in the law reduce 
legal risk, which means fewer lawsuits against ANCs, and keeps much 
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needed economic resources working for ANC shareholder economic and 
cultural welfare. Therefore, supporting changes in the law will assist 
ANCs to extend the goals of ANCSA into the next generation, and will 
result in corresponding positive benefits to the State of Alaska and the 
national economy as a whole. 
 
